Zones and conduits: how security protects safety

Industrial security is designed to protect safety-related functions from manipulation. Security is a prerequisite for functioning safety, and is mandatory in the EU’s Machinery Regulation which comes into force next January. But how do you provide holistic protection for an automation network? Andreas Willert, head of industrial security at Pilz Austria, explains.
Standards such as IEC 62443-3-2 and the forthcoming EN 50742 set out a clear direction: separating industrial systems into zones, and monitoring connections – a principle that runs through current recommendations from industry bodies and experts. The strict separation of safety and so-called standard automation is the key to effective machinery safety – underpinned by the defence-in-depth principle, and is implemented through an approach known as “zones and conduits”.
To make an analogy: a house can be built to be sturdy and safe, with solid walls, fire-resistant materials, reliable electrics and working alarms. Similar structural safety is a key to machinery safety, where design measures, sensor technologies and protective mechanisms prevent unintended hazards.
However, a house only remains safe if it is not subjected to deliberate interference. Manipulating its heating controls, sabotaging its electrical circuits or deactivating its alarm systems can transform a building designed with safety in mind, into a hazard.
In the world of machinery, the best safety-related design becomes ineffective if safety-related components are tampered with, or disabled without authorisation.
In this context, security plays an external protection role. Sturdy doors, secure access points, monitored connections and barriers can prevent unauthorised interventions. Security does not protect against accidents, but instead stops protective mechanisms from being disabled – by individuals who gain access via an unauthorised operating mode selection or actions, for example.
Security for safety
For the first time, the Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 makes security a mandatory requirement for functioning safety on plant and machinery. Safety functions must not be compromised due to manipulation, whether intentional or otherwise. This is where the emerging EN 50742 standard comes in. It will help to clarify the essential security requirements of the Machinery Regulation. The standard defines technical details for protection against corruption, and sets out clear requirements for hardware, software and data that may affect safety-related functions. The standard covers the entire lifecycle, from development through to operation and decommissioning.

The existing IEC 62443 series of standards, which set out a systematic approach to cybersecurity for industrial automation and control systems (see table above), also play a key role. They provide a structured framework for risk analysis, “defence-in-depth” and the principle of segmentation – the zones and conduits, mentioned previously. They are explicitly recognised in EN 50742 as an alternative or complementary approach to safeguarding security.
The range of topics covered in IEC 62443 runs from risk analysis, to requirements for secure operation and the secure development of products (security by design). It currently offers the best orientation guide for plant operators, machine-builders and device manufacturers when it comes to implementing industrial security effectively. The standard covers five areas: foundational industrial security requirements; the principle of zones and conduits; security levels; the security lifecycle; and risk analysis.
Together, IEC 62443 and EN 50742 form the normative core of security for safety. They require the digital integrity of a machine to be recognised as a prerequisite for its functional safety, and protected accordingly.
Zones and conduits make machinery safer
Returning to the analogy of the house. The boiler room represents a zone, while the connection to the smart home gateway represents the associated conduit. If this connection is manipulated, the entire system can be affected – even if the room is perfectly secure. Therefore, it is not only crucial to safeguard the individual zones, but also the security of the routes that connect them.
This is precisely where the zones and conduits principle comes into play. Zones are clearly separated from one another, and the transitions between them are designed to be monitored. Just as in a house, where doors and assigned keys determine who can go where, internal protection (safety) and external protection from manipulation (security) are intertwined in an industrial plant.
The result is a protection concept based on the defence-in-depth principle. Safety is not achieved through a single barrier, but through multiple layers of protection arranged one after the other. If one layer is overcome, the next one stands firm. Zones form these tiered spaces, while conduits are the monitored passageways between them. This way, a single vulnerability cannot compromise the entire system – particularly when it’s a matter of safety and therefore protecting people.
At Pilz, we are pursuing this approach as security-for-safety, safety being the primary protection goal of security. The focus is on protecting safety which, in turn, protects people. That is why we separate safety from general machine control, thus reducing the exposure of safety-related functions. The more clearly these “assets” are separated functionally, the fewer additional safety measures are needed to provide reliable protection.
The benefits of this approach are evident throughout the entire lifecycle of a machine. If safety functions and standard functions are separate, there is no need to recertify or adapt the safety functions in parallel if the standard functions are updated. This reduces maintenance and servicing work significantly. Classic safety controllers also require considerably fewer safety-critical updates than standard controllers, so this separation eliminates the need for many unnecessary interventions.
Separation also offers technological advantages. A standalone safety system, such as Pilz’s PNOZmulti 2 safe small controller, can be combined freely with control systems from different manufacturers, unlike integrated systems which are often tied to specific technologies. At the same time, separate safety systems raise the bar for attackers, because they must be compromised individually, making manipulation much more difficult. What’s more, a standard system can be online when needed, while the actual safety functions remain isolated, thus drastically reducing the attack surface.
This separation of safety and security automation – each with perfectly coordinated security levels – also increases efficiency by making it easier to plan safety, maintenance and expansion measures. So changes to the standard program do not require any intervention in the safety-related section, significantly reducing the amount of programming and adaptation work required.
Simultaneously, this separation has a positive impact on software and support costs, as separate systems often incur lower licence and service fees.
Protection through separation
The clear separation of safety and standard automation not only ensures technical robustness, but also reduces operator errors and lowers training requirements. As safety-related functions run on dedicated hardware and are clearly separated in organisational terms, they remain protected even if changes are made to the standard program. As a result, errors in day-to-day operations do not compromise safety, and responsibilities can be assigned more clearly.
At Pilz, we are offering a training and service programme to help companies implement this architecture. These include the training courses “Fundamentals of Industrial Security” and “CESA – Certified Expert for Security in Automation”, as well as industrial security services. These explain how to develop robust security for safety concepts from the individual blocks, but also go much further. They demonstrate: how to manage security risks systematically and develop holistic safety concepts; how to incorporate the requirements of IEC 62443; how to structure the architecture of a safe machine network; and how to assess and continuously improve the effectiveness of the measures that are taken.
One key advantage of this approach: operators at the end-user do not need to be deeply immersed in issues of security because the protection of the safety functions is already guaranteed by the architectural design. For this reason, the training courses are aimed primarily at those who make security decisions or design systems, while operators can continue to work safely without needing additional training in industrial security. The result is a practical division of roles, simplifying plant operation while at the same time sustainably increasing the level of protection.
An effective security-for-safety strategy is not achieved through individual measures, but through a well-thought-out architecture, clear lines of responsibility and targeted skills development. With a strict focus on defence-in-depth and a clear separation between safety and standard automation, we are laying the foundations for resilient machinery, supplemented by practical training and consultancy to ensure that companies can follow this path with confidence. The result is a level of safety that not only meets the requirements of the standards, but also delivers tangible added value in day-to-day operations – simpler, more robust and effective, long-term.

